Strong isomorphism in Marinatto-Weber type quantum games by Frąckiewicz, Piotr
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
06
10
0v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
1 J
an
 20
17
Strong isomorphism in Marinatto-Weber type quantum games
Piotr Fra˛ckiewicz
Institute of Mathematics
Pomeranian University, Poland
February 19, 2018
Abstract
Our purpose is to focus attention on a new criterion for quantum schemes by bringing together the notions of
quantum game and game isomorphism. A quantum game scheme is required to generate the classical game as a
special case. Now, given a quantum game scheme and two isomorphic classical games, we additionally require
the resulting quantum games to be isomorphic as well. We show how this isomorphism condition influences the
players’ strategy sets. We are concerned with the Marinatto-Weber type quantum game scheme and the strong
isomorphism between games in strategic form.
1 Introduction
The Marinatto-Weber (MW) scheme introduced in [1] is a straightforward way to apply the power of quantum
mechanics to classical game theory. In the simplest case of 2 × 2 games, the players manipulate their own qubits
of a two-qubit state either with the identity 1 or the Pauli operator σx. Therefore, it has found application in many
other branches of game theory: from evolutionary game theory [2], [3] to extensive-form games [4] and duopoly
examples [5], [6]. In paper [7] we pointed out a few undesirable properties of the MW scheme and introduced a
refined quantum game model.
Though it is possible to extend both the MW scheme and our refinement to consider more complex games than
2 × 2, possible generalizations can be defined in many different ways. A result concerning 3 × 3 games can be
found in [2] and [8]. The authors proposed suitable three-element sets of players’ strategies to obtain a generalized
3 × 3 game. On the other hand, our work [9] provides another way to define players’ strategy sets that remains
valid for any finite n × m games.
Certainly, one can find yet other ways to generalize the MW scheme. Hence it would be interesting to place
additional restrictions on a quantum game scheme and examine how they refine the quantum model. In this paper
we formulate a criterion in terms of isomorphic games. Given two isomorphic games we require the corresponding
quantum games to be isomorphic as well. If, for example, two bimatrix games differ only in the order of players’
strategies, they describe the same problem from a game-theoretical point of view. Given a quantum scheme,
it appears reasonable to assume that the resulting quantum game will not depend on the numbering of players’
strategies in the classical game.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Marinatto-weber type quantum game scheme
In paper [7] and [10] we presented a refinement of the Marinatto-Weber scheme [1]. The motivation of constructing
our scheme was twofold. Our model enables the players to choose between playing a fixed quantum strategy and
classical strategies. The second aim was to construct the scheme that generates the classical game by manipulating
the players’ strategies rather than the initial quantum state. In what follows, we recall the scheme for the case of
2 × 2 bimatrix game,
( l r
t (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
b (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
)
, where (ai j, bi j) ∈ R. (1)
Definition 1 The quantum scheme for game (1) is defined on an inner product space (C2)⊗4 by the triple
ΓQ = (H, (S 1, S 2), (M1, M2)), (2)
where
1
• H is a positive operator,
H = (1 ⊗ 1 − |11〉〈11|) ⊗ |00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11| ⊗ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (3)
and
|Ψ〉 = α|00〉 + β|01〉 + γ|10〉 + δ|11〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2 (4)
such that ‖|Ψ〉‖ = 1,
• S 1 =
{
P(1)i ⊗ U (3)j , i, j = 0, 1
}
, S 2 =
{
P(2)k ⊗ U
(4)
l , k, l = 0, 1
}
are the players’ strategy sets, and the upper
indices identify the subspace C2 of (C2)⊗4 on which the operators
P0 = |0〉〈0|, P1 = |1〉〈1|, U0 = 1, U1 = σx, (5)
are defined,
• M1 and M2 are the measurement operators
M1(2) = 1 ⊗ 1 ⊗

∑
x,y=0,1
axy(bxy)|xy〉〈xy|
 (6)
that depend on the payoffs axy and bxy from (1).
The scheme proceeds in the similar way as the MW scheme–the players determine the final state by choosing their
strategies and acting on operator H. As a result, they determine the following density operator:
ρ f =
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)
H
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)
=

|11〉〈11| ⊗
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l |Ψ〉〈Ψ|U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)
if i = j = 1,
|i j〉〈i j| ⊗
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l |00〉〈00|U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)
if otherwise.
(7)
Next, the payoffs for player 1 and 2 are
tr(ρ f M1) and tr(ρ f M2). (8)
As it was shown in [10], scheme (2) can be summarized by the following matrix game

P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
1 ⊗ σ
(4)
x
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3) X00 X01 X00 X01
P(1)0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x X10 X11 X10 X11
P(1)1 ⊗ 1(4) X00 X01 ∆00 ∆01
P(1)1 ⊗ σ
(4)
x X10 X11 ∆10 ∆11

, (9)
where
Xi j = (ai j, bi j), for i, j = 0, 1
∆00 = |α|2X00 + |β|2X01 + |γ|2X10 + |δ|2X11,
∆01 = |α|2X01 + |β|2X00 + |γ|2X11 + |δ|2X10,
∆10 = |α|2X10 + |β|2X11 + |γ|2X00 + |δ|2X01,
∆11 = |α|2X11 + |β|2X10 + |γ|2X01 + |δ|2X00.
(10)
2.2 Strong isomorphism
The notion of strong isomorphism defines classes of games that are the same up to the numbering of the players
and the order of players’ strategies. The following definitions are taken from [11] (see also [12], [13] and [14]).
The first one defines a mapping that associates players and their actions in one game with players and their actions
in the other game.
Definition 2 Let Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ′ = (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N) be games in strategic form. A game mappingf from Γ to Γ′ is a tuple f = (η, (ϕi)i∈N), where η is a bijection from N to N and for any i ∈ N, ϕi is a bijection from
S i to S ′η(i).
2
In general case, the mapping f from (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) to (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N) identifies player i ∈ N with player
η(i) and maps S i to S η(i). This means that a strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n is mapped into profile
(s′1, . . . , s′n) that satisfies equation s′η(i) = ϕi(si) for i ∈ N.
The notion of game mapping is a basis for the definition of game isomorphism. Depending on how rich
structure of the game is to be preserved we can distinguish various types of game isomorphism. One that preserves
the players’ payoff functions is called a strong isomorphism. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 3 Given two strategic games Γ = (N, (S i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ′ = (N, (S ′i )i∈N , (u′i)i∈N), a game mappingf = (η, (ϕi)i∈N) is called a strong isomorphism if relation ui(s) = u′η(i)( f (s)) holds for each i ∈ N and each strategy
profile s ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n.
From the above definition it may be concluded that if there is a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ′, they
may differ merely by the numbering of players and the order of their strategies.
The following lemma shows that relabeling players and their strategies do not affect the game with regard to
Nash equilibria. If f is a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ′, one may expect that the Nash equilibria in
Γ map to ones in Γ′ under f .
Lemma 1 Let f be a strong isomorphism between games Γ and Γ′. Strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) ∈ S 1×· · ·×S n
is a Nash equilibrium in game Γ if and only if f (s∗) ∈ S ′1 × · · · × S ′n is a Nash equilibrium in Γ′.
3 Application of game isomorphism to Marinatto-Weber type quantum
game schemes
It is not hard to see that we can define a wide variety of schemes based on the MW approach. We can modify oper-
ator (3) and the players’ strategies to construct another scheme still satisfying the requirement about generalization
of the input game. The following example of such a scheme is particularly interesting.
Let us consider a triple
Γ
′
Q = (H′, (S ′1, S ′2), (M1, M2)) (11)
with the components defined as follows:
• H′ is a positive operator,
H′ = |00〉〈00| ⊗ |00〉〈00| + |01〉〈01| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ2 + |10〉〈10| ⊗ ρ1 ⊗ |0〉〈0| + |11〉〈11| ⊗ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (12)
where |Ψ〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2 such that ‖|Ψ〉‖ = 1, ρ1 and ρ2 are the reduced density operators of |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, i.e.,
ρ1 = tr2(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) and ρ2 = tr1(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|),
• S ′1 =
{
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3), P
(1)
0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x , P
(1)
1 ⊗ 1(3)
}
and S ′2 =
{
P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4), P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x , P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4)
}
are the players’ strat-
egy sets,
• M1 and M2 are the measurement operators defined by equation (6).
It is immediate that the resulting final state ρ′f is a density operator for each (pure or mixed) strategy profile. For
example, player 1’s strategy P(1)0 ⊗ σ(3)x and player 2’s strategy P(2)1 ⊗ 1(4) imply
ρ′f =
(
P(1)0 ⊗ P
(2)
1 ⊗ σ(3)x ⊗ 1(4)
)
H′
(
P(1)0 ⊗ P
(2)
1 ⊗ σ(3)x ⊗ 1(4)
)
= |01〉〈01| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ2. (13)
As a result, the players’ payoff functifons u′1 and u′2 given by tr(ρ′f M1) and tr(ρ′f M2), respectively, are well-defined.
It is also clear that scheme (11) produces the classical game in a similar way to scheme (2). The players play
the classical game as long as they choose the strategies P0 ⊗ 1 and P0 ⊗ σx. This can be seen by determin-
ing tr(ρ′f M1(2)) for each strategy profile and arranging the obtained values into a matrix. As an example, let us
determine tr(ρ′f M1(2)) for the final state ρ′f given by (13). Let |Ψ〉 represent a general two qubit state,
|Ψ〉 = α|00〉 + β|01〉 + γ|10〉 + δ|11〉. (14)
Since
ρ1 = (|α|2 + |β|2)|0〉〈0| + (αγ∗ + βδ∗)|0〉〈1| + (γα∗ + δβ∗)|1〉〈0| + (|γ|2 + |δ|2)|1〉〈1|,
ρ2 = (|α|2 + |γ|2)|0〉〈0| + (αβ∗ + γδ∗)|0〉〈1| + (βα∗ + δγ∗)|1〉〈0| + (|β|2 + |δ|2)|1〉〈1|,
(15)
the players’ strategies P(1)0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x and P(2)1 ⊗ 1(4) generate the following form of the final state:
ρ′f = |01〉〈01| ⊗
(
(|α|2 + |γ|2)|10〉〈10|+ (αβ∗ + γδ∗)|10〉〈11| + (βα∗ + δγ∗)|11〉〈10| + (|β|2 + |δ|2)|11〉〈11|
)
. (16)
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Hence
(tr(ρ′f M1), tr(ρ′f M2)) = (|α|2 + |γ|2)(a10, b10) + (|β|2 + |δ|2)(a11, b11). (17)
The values (tr(ρ′f M1), tr(ρ′f M2)) for all strategy combinations are given by the following matrix:

P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4)
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3) X00 X01 ∆02
P(1)0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x X10 X11 ∆12
P(1)1 ⊗ 1(3) ∆20 ∆21 ∆22
 (18)
where
Xi j = (ai j, bi j), for i, j = 0, 1
∆02 = (|α|2 + |γ|2)X00 + (|β|2 + |δ|2)X01;
∆12 = (|α|2 + |γ|2)X10 + (|β|2 + |δ|2)X11;
∆20 = (|α|2 + |β|2)X00 + (|γ|2 + |δ|2)X10;
∆21 = (|α|2 + |β|2)X01 + (|γ|2 + |δ|2)X11;
∆22 = |α|2X00 + |β|2X01 + |γ|2X10 + |δ|2X11. (19)
It follows easily that matrix game (18) is a genuine extension of (1). Although payoff profiles ∆i j , ∆22 are also
achievable in (1), the players, in general, are not able to obtain ∆22 when choosing their (mixed) strategies.
To sum up, scheme (11) might seem to be acceptable as long as scheme (2) is acceptable. Matrix game (18)
includes (1) and depending on the initial state |Ψ〉 it may give extraordinary Nash equilibria. It is worth pointing
out that the Nash equilibria in (18) correspond to correlated equilibria in (1), (see [15]). However scheme (11) fails
to imply the isomorphic games when the input games are isomorphic. We can make this clear with the following
example.
Example 1 Let us consider the game of “Chicken" Γ1 and its (strongly) isomorphic counterpart Γ2,
Γ1 :
( l r
t (6, 6) (2, 7)
b (7, 2) (0, 0)
)
, Γ2 :
( l′ r′
t′ (2, 7) (6, 6)
b′ (0, 0) (7, 2)
)
. (20)
The corresponding isomorphism f = (pi, ϕ1, ϕ2) is defined by components
pi(i) = i for i = 1, 2, ϕ1 = (t → t′, b → b′), ϕ2 = (l → r′, r → l′). (21)
Set |Ψ〉 = (|00〉 + |01〉 + |10〉)/√3. Using (9) we can write quantum approach (2) to games (20) as
ΓQ1 :

P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
1 ⊗ σ
(4)
x
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3) (6, 6) (2, 7) (6, 6) (2, 7)
P(1)0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x (7, 2) (0, 0) (7, 2) (0, 0)
P(1)1 ⊗ 1(4) (6, 6) (2, 7) (5, 5) (2 23 , 4 13 )
P(1)1 ⊗ σ
(4)
x (7, 2) (0, 0) (4 13 , 2 23 ) (3, 3)

(22)
and
ΓQ2 :

P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
1 ⊗ σ
(4)
x
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3) (2, 7) (6, 6) (2, 7) (6, 6)
P(1)0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x (0, 0) (7, 2) (0, 0) (7, 2)
P(1)1 ⊗ 1(4) (2, 7) (6, 6) (2 23 , 4 13 ) (5, 5)
P(1)1 ⊗ σ(4)x (0, 0) (7, 2) (3, 3) (4 13 , 2 23 )

(23)
It is fairly easy to see that games (22) and (23) differ in the order of the first two strategies and the second two
strategies of player 2. Thus, the games are strongly isomorphic. More formally, one can check that a game mapping
˜f = (η, ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2), where
ϕ˜1 =
(
P(1)i ⊗ 1(3) → P(1)i ⊗ 1(3), P(1)i ⊗ σ(3)x → P(1)i ⊗ σ(3)x
)
,
ϕ˜1 =
(
P(2)k ⊗ 1(4) → P
(2)
k ⊗ σ(4)x , P
(2)
k ⊗ σ(4)x → P
(2)
k ⊗ 1(4)
)
,
(24)
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for i, k = 0, 1 is a strong isomorphism.
In the next section we prove a more general result about scheme (2)).
Let us now consider scheme (11). Matrix (18) in terms of input games (20) implies
Γ
′
Q1 :

P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4)
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3) (6, 6) (2, 7) (4 23 , 6 13 )
P(1)0 ⊗ σ(3)x (7, 2) (0, 0) (4 23 , 1 13 )
P(1)1 ⊗ 1(3) (6 13 , 4 23 ) (1 13 , 4 23 ) (5, 5)

(25)
and
Γ
′
Q2 :

P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4) P
(2)
0 ⊗ σ
(4)
x P
(2)
1 ⊗ 1(4)
P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3) (2, 7) (6, 6) (3 13 , 6 23 )
P(1)0 ⊗ σ
(3)
x (0, 0) (7, 2) (2 13 , 23 )
P(1)1 ⊗ 1(3) (1 13 , 4 23 ) (6 13 , 4 23 ) (2 23 , 4 13 )

. (26)
With Lemma 1 we can show that games (25) and (26) are not isomorphic. Comparing the sets of pure Nash
equilibria in both games we find the equilibrium profiles
{(P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3), P(2)0 ⊗ σ(4)x ), (P(1)0 ⊗ σ(3)x , P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4)), (P(1)1 ⊗ 1(3), P(2)1 ⊗ 1(4))} (27)
in the first game and
{(P(1)0 ⊗ 1(3), P(2)0 ⊗ 1(4)), (P(1)0 ⊗ σ(3)x , P(2)0 ⊗ σ(4)x )} (28)
in the second one.
4 Application of game isomorphism to generalized Marinatto-Weber quan-
tum game scheme
Additional criteria for a quantum game scheme may have a significant impact on the way how we generalize these
schemes. It can be easily seen in the case of the MW scheme [1] (or the refined scheme (2)), where the sets of
unitary strategies are finite. The MW scheme provides us with a quantum model, where the strategy sets consist of
the identity operator 1 and the Pauli operator σx. Under this description, what subsets of unitary operators would
be suitable for general n × m games? The case of a 3-element strategy set can be identified with unitary operators
13, C and D acting on α|0〉 + β|1〉 + γ|2〉 ∈ C3, where
13|0〉 = |0〉, C|0〉 = |2〉, D|0〉 = |1〉,
13|1〉 = |1〉, C|1〉 = |1〉, D|1〉 = |0〉,
13|2〉 = |2〉, C|2〉 = |0〉, D|2〉 = |2〉.
(29)
This construction can be found in [2] and [8]. Another way to generalize the MW scheme was presented in
[9]. Having given a strategic-form game, we identify the players’ n strategies with n unitary operators Vk for
k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. They act on states of the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |n − 1〉} as follows:
V0|i〉 = |i〉,
V1|i〉 = |i + 1 mod n〉,
...
Vn−1|i〉 = |i + n − 1 mod n〉.
(30)
Both ways to generalize the MW scheme enable us to obtain the classical game. So at this level, neither (29) nor
(30) is questionable. If we seek other properties, we see that the MW scheme outputs the classical game (or its
isomorphic counterpart) when the initial state is one of the computational basis states. Given (29) and (30), only
the latter case satisfies this condition. Further analysis would show that the MW scheme is invariant with respect
to strongly isomorphic input games. It turns out that neither (29) or (30) satisfies the isomorphism property.
Example 2 Let us take a look at the following 2 × 3 bimatrix games:
Γ :
( l m r
t (4, 8) (0, 0) (8, 8)
b (0, 4) (4, 0) (8, 0)
)
, Γ′ :
( l′ m′ r′
t′ (0, 0) (4, 8) (8, 8)
b′ (4, 0) (0, 4) (8, 0)
)
. (31)
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Consider the MW-type approaches ΓQ and Γ′Q to games (31) according to the following assignement:
( l m r
t P00 P01 P02
b P10 P11 P12
)
, where P j1 j2 = | j1 j2〉〈 j1 j2|. (32)
Then
ΓQ = (|Ψ〉, (D1, D2), (M1, M2)), Γ′Q = (|Ψ〉, (D′1, D′2), (M′1, M′2)), (33)
where
M1 = 4P00 + 8P02 + 4P11 + 8P12, M′1 = 4P01 + 8P02 + 4P10 + 8P12,
M2 = 8P00 + 8P02 + 4P10, M′2 = 8P01 + 8P02 + 4P11.
(34)
Set the initial state |Ψ〉 = (1/2)|00〉 + (√3/2)|12〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C3 and assume first that D1 = D′1 = {12, σx} and D2 =
D′2 = {13,C, D} as in (29). Determining tr
(
(U1 ⊗ U2)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(U†1 ⊗ U†2)Mi
)
for every U1 ⊗U2 ∈ {1, σx} ⊗ {13,C, D}
and i = 1, 2, and doing similar calculations in the case of M′i we obtain
ΓQ :
( 13 C D
12 (7, 2) (2, 5) (6, 0)
σx (6, 7) (5, 6) (7, 6)
)
, Γ′Q :
( 13 C D
12 (6, 0) (5, 2) (7, 2)
σx (7, 6) (2, 0) (6, 7)
)
. (35)
On the other hand, replacing (29) by (30) gives D2 = D′2 = {13,V1,V2}, where
13 =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 , V1 =

0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
 , V2 =

0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0
 . (36)
Then, we have
ΓQ :
( 13 V1 V2
12 (7, 2) (0, 3) (5, 2)
σx (6, 7) (4, 6) (2, 0)
)
, Γ′Q :
( 13 V1 V2
12 (6, 0) (4, 2) (2, 5)
σx (7, 6) (0, 1) (5, 6)
)
. (37)
There is no pure Nash equilibrium in the first game of (35) and (37), whereas there are two Nash equilibria in the
second games. As a result, each pair of the games do not determine a strong isomorphism.
Example 2 shows that players’ strategy sets defined by (29) and (36) need to be revised in order to have a general-
ized MW scheme invariant with respect to the isomorphism. We shall stick for the moment to considering games
(31). Let {A012, A102, A021, A120, A201, A210} be player 2’s strategy set defined to be
A012|0〉 = |0〉 A102|0〉 = |1〉 A021|0〉 = |0〉 A120|0〉 = |1〉 A201|0〉 = |2〉 A210|0〉 = |2〉,
A012|1〉 = |1〉 A102|1〉 = |0〉 A021|1〉 = |2〉 A120|1〉 = |2〉 A201|1〉 = |0〉 A210|1〉 = |1〉,
A012|2〉 = |2〉 A102|2〉 = |2〉 A021|2〉 = |1〉 A120|2〉 = |0〉 A201|2〉 = |1〉 A210|2〉 = |0〉.
(38)
Each A j1 j2 j3 is a permutation matrix that corresponds to a specific permutation pi = (0 → j1, 1 → j2, 2 → j3) of
the set {0, 1, 2}. Note also that operators (29) and (36) are included in (38). Hence, the MW scheme with (38)
implies, in particular, the classical game. We now check if it outputs the isomorphic games. Since there are now
six operators available for player 2, the resulting game may be written as a 2 × 6 bimatrix game with entries
tr
(
(U1 ⊗ U2)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(UT1 ⊗ UT2 )Mi
)
(39)
for U1 ∈ {12, σx} and U2 ∈ {Api : pi − permutations of {0, 1, 2}}. As a result, we obtain
ΓQ :

A012 A102 A021 A120 A201 A210
12 (7, 2) (6, 0) (4, 2) (0, 3) (5, 2) (2, 5)
σx (6, 7) (7, 6) (0, 1) (4, 6) (2, 0) (5, 6)
 (40)
and
Γ
′
Q :

A012 A102 A021 A120 A201 A210
12 (6, 0) (7, 2) (0, 3) (4, 2) (2, 5) (5, 2)
σx (7, 6) (6, 7) (4, 6) (0, 1) (5, 6) (2, 0)
. (41)
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The games determine the isomorphism ˜f = (idN , ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2), where
ϕ˜1 = (12 → 12, σx → σx),
ϕ˜2 = (A012 → A102, A102 → A012, A021 → A120, A120 → A021, A201 → A210, A210 → A201).
(42)
Using permutation matrices leads us to formulate another generalized MW scheme. For simplicity, we confine
attention to (n + 1) × (m + 1) bimatrix games.
Let S n be the set of all permutations pi of {0, 1, . . . , n}. With each pi there is associated a permutation matrix Api,
Api|i〉 = |pi(i)〉 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. (43)
We let Bσ denote the permutation matrix associated with a permutation σ ∈ S m. Given (n + 1) × (m + 1) bimatrix
game Γ we define
ΓQ = (|Ψ〉, (D1, D2), (M1, M2)), (44)
where
|Ψ〉 =
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
α j1 j2 | j1 j2〉 ∈ Cn+1 ⊗ Cm+1, D1 = {Api : pi ∈ S n}, D2 = {Bσ : σ ∈ S m},
(M1, M2) =
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
(a j1 j2 , b j1 j2 )P j1 j2 .
(45)
Before stating the main result of this section we start with the observation that the MW scheme remains invariant
to numbering of the players. Consider two isomorphic bimatrix games:
Γ :

t0 t1 · · · tm
s0 (a00, b00) (a01, b01) · · · (a0m, b0m)
s1 (a10, b10) (a11, b11) · · · (a1m, b1m)
...
...
...
. . .
...
sn (an0, bn0) (an1, bn1) · · · (anm, bnm)

(46)
and
Γ
′ :

s′0 s
′
1 · · · s′n
t′0 (b00, a00) (b10, a10) · · · (bn0, an0)
t′1 (b01, a01) (b11, a11) · · · (bn1, an1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
t′m (b0m, a0m) (b1m, a1m) · · · (bnm, anm)

. (47)
Clearly, the isomorphism is defined by a game mapping f = {pi, ϕ1, ϕ2}, where
pi = (1 → 2, 2 → 1), ϕ1(s j1 ) = s′j1 , ϕ2(t j2 ) = t′j2 (48)
for j1 = 0, 1, . . . , n, j2 = 0, 1, . . . ,m. The general MW scheme for (46) is simply given by (44). For Γ′, we can
write
Γ
′
Q = (|Ψ′〉, (D′1, D′2), (M′1, M′2)), (49)
where
|Ψ′〉 =
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
α j1 j2 | j2 j1〉 ∈ Cm+1 ⊗ Cn+1,
D′1 = {Bσ, σ ∈ S m}, D′2 = {Api, pi ∈ S n},
M′1 =
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
b j1 j2 | j2 j1〉〈 j2 j1|, M′2 =
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
a j1 j2 | j2 j1〉〈 j2 j1|.
(50)
Games determined by (44) and (49) are then isomorphic. To prove this, let ˜f = (pi, ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) be a game mapping such
that
pi = (1 → 2, 2 → 1), ϕ˜1 : D1 → D′2, ϕ˜1(Api) = Api, ϕ˜2 : D2 → D′1, ϕ˜2(Bσ) = Bσ. (51)
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On account of Definition 3 we have
˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ) = ϕ2(Bσ) ⊗ ϕ1(Api) = Bσ ⊗ Api. (52)
As a result,
u′pi(1)( ˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)) = u′2( ˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ))
= tr
(
˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′| ˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)T M′2
)
= tr
(
(ϕ2(Bσ) ⊗ ϕ1(Api))|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|(ϕ2(Bσ)T ⊗ ϕ1(Api)T )M′2
)
= tr
(Bσ ⊗ Api)|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|(BTσ ⊗ ATpi )
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
a j1 j2 | j2 j1〉〈 j2 j1|

= tr
(Api ⊗ Bσ)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(ATpi ⊗ BTσ)
n∑
j1=0
m∑
j2=0
a j1 j2 | j1 j2〉〈 j1 j2|

= u1(Api ⊗ Bσ). (53)
By a similar argument, we can show that u′
pi(2)( ˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)) = u2(Api ⊗ Bσ). We can now formulate the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume that Γ and Γ′ are strongly isomorphic bimatrix games and ΓQ and Γ′Q are the corresponding
quantum games defined by (44). Then ΓQ and Γ′Q are strongly isomorphic.
Proof Let Γ and Γ′ be bimatrix games of dimension n × m and let f : Γ → Γ′, f = (η, ϕ1, ϕ2) be the strong
isomorphism. Since the MW scheme is invariant to numbering of the players, there is no loss of generality in
assuming η = idN . Now, it follows from Definition 3 that games Γ and Γ′ differ in the order of players’ strategies.
Let us identify players’ strategies (i.e., rows and columns) in Γ with sequences (0, 1, . . . , n) and (0, 1, . . . ,m),
respectively. Then, we denote by pi∗ and σ∗ the permutations of the sets {0, 1, . . . , n} and {0, 1, . . . ,m} associated
with the order of strategies in game Γ′. A trivial verification shows that the payoff operator M′i in Γ′Q may be
written as
M′i = (Api∗ ⊗ Bσ∗) Mi (Api∗ ⊗ Bσ∗ )T , (54)
where Api∗ and Bσ∗ are the permutation matrices corresponding to pi∗ and σ∗. Define a game mapping ˜f =
(idN , ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2), where
ϕ˜1 : {Api : pi ∈ S n} → {Api : pi ∈ S n}, ϕ1(Api) = Api∗ Api;
ϕ˜2 : {Bσ : σ ∈ S m} → {Bσ : σ ∈ S m}, ϕ2(Bσ) = Bσ∗ Bσ.
(55)
Hence, ˜f maps Api ⊗ Bσ to Api∗ Api ⊗ Bσ∗ Bσ. Thus, we obtain
u′i( ˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)) = tr
(
˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
(
˜f (Api ⊗ Bσ)
)T
M′i
)
= tr
(
(Api∗ Api ⊗ Bσ∗ Bσ)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(Api∗ Api ⊗ Bσ∗ Bσ)T (Api∗ ⊗ Bσ∗ ) Mi (Api∗ ⊗ Bσ∗)T
)
= tr
(
(Api∗ ⊗ Bσ∗)T (Api∗ Api ⊗ Bσ∗ Bσ)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(Api∗Api ⊗ Bσ∗ Bσ)T (Api∗ ⊗ Bσ∗) Mi
)
= tr
((
ATpi∗ Api∗ Api ⊗ BTσ∗ Bσ∗ Bσ
)
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
(
ATpi ATpi∗ Api∗ ⊗ BTσBTσ∗ Bσ∗
)
Mi
)
= tr
(
(Api ⊗ Bσ) |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (Api ⊗ Bσ)T Mi
)
= ui(Api ⊗ Bσ). (56)
This finishes the proof. 
Note that operators (43) come down to 1 and σx for n = 1. Therefore, the original MW scheme preserves the
isomorphism. The same conclusion can be drawn for the refined MW scheme (2).
Corollary 1 If Γ and Γ′ are strongly isomorphic bimatrix games and ΓQ and Γ′Q are the corresponding games
defined by (2). Then ΓQ and Γ′Q are strongly isomorphic.
Proof Let Γ and Γ′ be strongly isomorphic 2 × 2 bimatrix games. By Proposition 1 there exists a strong iso-
morphism ˜f = (id{1,2}, ϕ˜1, ϕ˜2) between the games ΓQ and Γ′Q played according to (44)-(45). Given the quantum
approach (2) to Γ and Γ′ we define g˜ = (id{1,2}, ˜ξ1, ˜ξ2), where
˜ξ1 : S 1 → S 1, ˜ξ1
(
P(1)i ⊗ U (3)j
)
= P(1)i ⊗ ϕ˜1
(
U (3)j
)
,
˜ξ2 : S 2 → S 2, ˜ξ2
(
P(2)k ⊗ U
(4)
l
)
= P(2)k ⊗ ϕ˜2
(
U (4)l
)
.
(57)
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Now, we have
u′i
(
g˜
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
))
= tr
(
g˜
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)
Hg˜
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)T
M′1
)
= tr
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ ϕ˜1
(
U (3)j
)
⊗ ϕ˜2
(
U (4)l
)
HP(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ ϕ˜1
(
U (3)j
)T ⊗ ϕ˜2 (U (4)l
)T
M′i
)
= tr
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ ˜f
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)
HP(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ ˜f
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)T
M′i
)
. (58)
For fixed Pi ⊗ Pk, we can write the right side of (58) in the form
tr
(
|ik〉〈ik| ⊗ ˜f
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)
ρ ˜f
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)T
M′i
)
, ρ =

|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (i, j) = (1, 1);
|00〉〈00|, (i, j) , (1, 1). (59)
By reasoning similar to (56) we conclude that
u′i
(
g˜
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
))
= tr
(
|ik〉〈ik| ⊗ ˜f
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)
ρ ˜f
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)T
M′i
)
= tr
(
|ik〉〈ik| ⊗ U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l ρ
(
U (3)j ⊗ U (4)l
)T
M′i
)
= ui
(
P(1)i ⊗ P(2)k ⊗ U
(3)
j ⊗ U (4)l
)
. (60)
We have thus proved that ΓQ and Γ′Q are isomorphic. 
It is worth noting that the converse may not be true. Given isomorphic games ΓQ and Γ′Q, the input games Γ and Γ′
may not determine the strong isomorphism. Indeed, bimatrix games
( l r
t (3, 1) (0, 0)
b (0, 0) (1, 3)
)
and
( l′ r
t′ (4, 0) (0, 0)
b′ (0, 0) (0, 4)
)
(61)
are not strongly isomorphic. However the MW approach (with the initial state (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2) to each one of
(61) implies the same output game given by
( 1 σx
1 (3, 1) (0, 0)
σx (0, 0) (1, 3)
)
(62)
5 Conclusions
The theory of quantum games does not provide us with clear definitions of how a quantum game should look
like. In fact, only one condition is taken into consideration. A quantum game scheme is merely required to
generalize the classical game. As a result, this allows us to define a quantum game scheme in many different
ways. However, a wide variety of techniques to describe a game in the quantum domain can imply different
quantum game results. Therefore, it would be convenient to specify that some quantum schemes work under some
further restrictions. We have been working under the assumption that a quantum scheme is invariant with respect
to isomorphic transformations of an input game. We have shown that this requirement may be essential tool in
defining a quantum scheme. The protocol that replicates classical correlated equilibria is an example that does not
satisfy our criterion. The refined definition for a quantum game scheme may also be useful to generalize protocols.
Our work has shown that dependence of local unitary operators in the MW scheme on the number of strategies in
a classical game is not linear. In fact, the generalized approach to n × m bimatrix game can be identified with a
game of dimension n! × m!.
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